保罗·R·米尔格罗（Paul R. Milgrom），1948年诞生於美國底特律。1979年從美國斯坦福的斯坦福大學博士结業，現任美國斯坦福大學人文与科學传授。
罗伯特·威尔逊（RobertB. Wilson）
罗伯特·威尔逊（Robert B. Wilson），1937年诞生於美國日内瓦，1963年從美國剑桥的哈佛大學结業，美國斯坦福大學光荣辦理學亚當斯精采传授。
瑞典皇家科學院的授奖原文以下（中英版）
This year’s Laureates, Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson, have studied how auctions work. They have also used their insights to design new auction formats for goods and services that are difficult to sell in a traditional way, such as radio frequencies. Their discoveries have benefitted sellers, buyers and taxpayers around the world.
People have always sold things to the highest bidder, or bought them from whoever makes the cheapest offer. Nowadays, objects worth astronomical sums of money change hands every day in auctions, not only household objects, art and antiquities, but also securities, minerals and energy. Public procurements can also be conducted as auctions.
Using auction theory, researchers try to understand the outcomes of different rules for bidding and final prices, the auction format. The analysis is difficult, because bidders behave strategically, based on the available information. They take into consideration both what they know themselves and what they believe other bidders to know.
Robert Wilson developed the theory for auctions of objects with a co妹妹on value – a value which is uncertain before酵素黑咖啡,hand but, in the end, is the same for everyone. Examples include the future value of radio frequencies or the volume of minerals in a particular area. Wilson showed why rational bidders tend to place bids below their own best estimate of the co妹妹on value: they are worried about the winner’s curse – that is, abou痔瘡自療法,t paying too much and losing out.
Paul Milgrom formulated a more general theory of auctions that not only allows co妹妹on values, but also private values that vary from bidder to bidder. He analysed the bidding strategies in a number of well-known auction formats, demonstrating that a format will give the seller higher expected revenue when bidders learn more about each other’s estimated values during bidding.
Over time, societies have allocated ever more complex objects among users, such a減肥代餐,s landing slots and radio frequencies. In response, Milgrom and Wilson invented new formats for auctioning off many interrelated objects simultaneously, on behalf of a seller motivated by broad societal benefit rather than maximal revenue. In 1994, the US authorities first used one of their auction formats to sell radio frequencies to telecom operators. Since then, many other countries have followed suit.
“This year’s Laureates in Economic Sciences started out with fundamental theory and later used their results in practical applications, which have spread globally. Their discoveries are of great benefit to society,” says Peter Fredriksson, chair of the Prize Co妹妹ittee.